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An interpretation of style 
Anna-Maija Ylimaula's doctoral thesis on the 
origins of style is an ambitious work, dealing 
with philosophy as much as with the manifes-
tations of style in architecture. 
Ylimaula understands architecture as a lan-
guage which expresses the way of life and the 
values of people, while depending on the eco-
nomic, political, industrial and technological 
conditions of a given time. Beyond this, archi-
tecture is able to reveal spiritual values which 
transcend time and place. 
The specific purpose of the dissertation is the 
explanation of the nature and meaning of archi-
tectural style, the development of a universal 
theory of style and its application to, an evaluation 
of Art Nouveau - a style known also as Seces-
sionsstil, Jugendstil, Kansallisromantiikka and 
Modernismo Catalana. 
At the outset of her work Ylimaula reviews 
the different interpretations of style as given by 
philosophers from the first century B. C. until 
the present. She sketches viewpoints dealing 
with the aesthetic, technical, psychological and 
sociological dimensions of style, as well as the 
hermeneutic and phenomenological interpreta-
tions advanced by Edmund Husserl, Martin Hei-
degger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
Unfortunately, her deliberations lack clarity 
and important themes are incompletely presen-
ted. This is particularly the case in her dealing 
with Heidegger's theory of art on which her own 
theory rests. She fails to give Heidegger's ex-
planation of the word poetry, without which his 
use of the term remains unintelligible, and she 
misinterprets one of his statements which she 
quotes without being aware of the political 
message hidden within it. 
Concerning poetry, Heidegger referred in one 
of his lectures on Nietzsche to the Greek words 
poiein (perforating a creative act based on know-
ledge) and Poiesis (the result of the action). Ac-
cording to him, the word poiesia - poetry - is 
applicable to the result of knowledgeable crea-
tive activity in any field ot the arts, from archi-
tecture to language a r t His theory of art, as in-
troduced by Ylimaula, states: "Poetry is the es-
sence of architecture.*' Her theory of style pro-
claims: "Poetry is the essence of style." 
Concerning Heidegger's political attitude, it 
is important to keep in mind, that the essay Der 
Ursprung des Kunstwerkes which is the foun-
dation of Ylirnaula's work, was conceived in the 
years 1933/34 - the time, when his active par-
ticipation in the "nazification" of German uni-
versity life was at its peak. Ylimaula is familiar 
with his position which she opposes staunchly, 
without, however, feeling, that it interferes with 
his theory of art. 
For reasons of space, this topic cannot be 
discussed here. It must, however, be mentioned 
at a time in which fervent nationalism is ram-
pant in many parts of the earth. 
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Truth in architecture 
An interesting short chapter of the thesis deals 
with conflicts connected with demands of con-
struction, materials to be used and the role of 
ornamentation. Materials can be shown in their 
own right or hidden for the sake of elegance: 
bricks, e. g., covered by sheets of marble. Or-
namentation can be meaningful symbolism or 
empty artifact. Ylimaula stands for truth in ar-
chitecture which, she declares, "is simply hon-
esty in design and genuine materials." The mat-
ter is, however, not as simple as that. Looking, 
e. g., at the excessive guilded beauty of Vien-
nese Art Nouveau as expressed by Olbrich, Wag-
ner and the painter Klimt, one cannot help ask-
ing: Is art an active participant in the post-
Victorian attempt to hide behind beauty the 
reality of political deceit and social injustice? Or 
does it truthfully represent the mask of a deca-
dent society? 
The theory of style 
Having laid a comprehensive groundwork of 
philosophical viewpoints, Ylimaula proceeds to 
the presentation of her theory of style. In seven 
concise statements she proposes, that style is not 
a preconceived category, but that it evolves from 
the work of art and reveals the nature of this 
work. The work of art allows style to occur and 
style expresses artistic truth. The creation of a 
work of architecture is connected with preser-
vation: a creative spark had been received and is 
preserved in the work. Poetry (in the sense ex-
plained above) is the essence of architecture and 
the style evolving from it makes a mere building 
into a work of architecture. 
The seventh statement reads: "Architecture is 
bound to people and determines their essence 
and takes part in their history." 
Ylimaula elucidates the statement twice - the 
first time by quoting a paragraph from Heideg-
ger's essay on the origin of the work of art. It is 
a paragraph which relates art to history, which 
Ylimaula has not fully understood and hence 
mistranslates. 
Heidegger claims, that history is the carrying 
off of a people into its mandate ("in sein Auf-
gegebenes"), so as to integrate it into its dowry 
("in sein Mitgegebenes"). The core of the state-
ment is the national-socialist concept of a man-
date which a people has to carry out, so as to live 
up to the values bestowed on its race. Seen in 
context with Heidegger's convictions at the time 
of writing the sentence, it refers without doubt 
to the German people, though it can be applied to 
any nation. 
The application of the theory 
Ylimaula tests the practicability of her theory by 
using it for an analysis of Art Nouveau as de-
monstrated by the work of Antoni Gaudi, Char-
les Rennie Mackintosh and Otto Wagner. The 
analysis is preceded by short and factual bio-
graphies of the three architects. Two of these ac-
counts may be amplified by rather dramatic de-
tails which Ylimaula does not mention. 
Not unlike his countryman Ignatio de Loyola, 
Antoni Gaudi renounced the brilliant high so-
ciety life of his youth and spent his final years in 
religious absorption. He lived in a small studio in 
the still unfinished cathedral of the Sagrada Fa-
milia which was conceived as a great mystical 
poem, full of symbols related to the rules of li-
turgy. On the way to Masa, which he attended 
every evening at the church of San Filipo Neri, 
he was struck down by a tram, taken, unrecog-
nized, to a hospital for the poor and died there a 
few days later. 
Charles Rennie Mackintosh was one of ele-
ven siblings and handicapped by a clubfoot. Dis-
turbed by the noise and clutter of the home and 
by his handicap, he found relief in long solitary 
walks and an intimate acquaintance with na-
ture. Based on his scrutiny of the supportive 
structure of flowerstalks, he developed the au-
stere design of his buildings and interiors, and 
his aversion for clutter led to the purity of his 
style. 
The two examples bear out Ylimaula's thought, 
that style evolves from the structural concept of 
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a building and reveals what the building is meant 
to conway. Gaudi's work was marked by his 
strong relationship to nature and his religious 
convictions, while Mackintosh combined his 
view of nature with his belief in ancestral Scot-
tish ideals. Wagner related the basic forms of 
Hellenic architecture to new materials and mo-
dern techniques. 
The idea, that architectural structure permits 
personal style to manifest itself is realized in the 
exuberant forms of Gaudi's early work which is 
inspired by the cosmic forces of nature, in Mack-
intosh's floral motives and geometric design, 
and in Wagner's "Nutzstil" which combines aes-
thetic visions with highly practical purposes. 
His church of the Steinhof was designed for 
mental patients, requiring particular care and 
hygienic precautions. In surroundings of pre-
raphaelite beauty the sanctuary offers features 
such as a descending floor which facilitates 
quick cleaning by flushing water down the ais-
les, dispensation of holy water by pressing a 
tube, inserted in the font, and a first aid room and 
toilets in easy reach. 
Each of the three architects expressed in his 
style his own concept of truth, be it found in re-
ligious faith, the beauty of simplicity or in clas-
sic harmony. 
The concept of poetry as essence of architec-
ture corresponds with the young Gaudi's re-
mark, that ornamentation equals the meter and 
rhythm of a poem, as well as with the aging 
master's statement, that his mystic theory of 
proportions is a symbolic expression of the 
Trinity. 
The nationalistic core of the seventh stament 
of the theory is documented by Gaudi's use of 
Catalonian traditions of style and Mackintosh's 
reliance on Scottish baronial architecture. 
Wagner's work is free of national traits. The 
multi-national Austro-Hungarian monarchy did 
not lend itself to the development of a specific 
national character. 
The application o f Ylimaula's theory of style 
does reveal c o m m o n elements in the work of 
three utterly different personalities. Though all 
of them are considered representatives of Art 
Nouveau, it cannot be overlooked, that Gaudi 
belongs to the variety called Moderenismo Ca-
talana and Wagner to tbe Viennese Secession, 
while Mackintosh is a forerunner of the Bau-
haus Stil 
C o n c l u s i o n 
In summing up her findings, Ylimaula states 
that, despite much criticism levelled at Art Nou-
veau, it ought to be recognized as an important 
phase in the history of architecture, a meeting 
point between historicism and functionalism. 
While there are great differences in the work of 
the three architects under discussion, the nu-
merous traits which they have in common prove 
that "in the light of the universal theory of style 
and because of its essence Art Nouveau has a 
coherent content and thus without any doubt is 
also style." 
Y l i m a u l a is s a t i s f i e d 
w i t h her f i n d i n g s 
The reader of the dissertation has to battle with 
a profusion of difficult and by no means clearly 
presented philosophical theories, incomplete 
trends of thought, faulty use of the English 
language (with the only exception of Kirsti Si-
monsuuri's beautiful translation of Aila Meri-
luoto's Gaudi-poems) and the basic question, 
whether the theory lends itself to practical use 
in the study of architecture. 
Nevertheless, the dissertation contains so 
many thought-provoking topics and its three 
protagonists are such fascinating artists, that it 
is well worth to be given attention. 
Anne Fried, 
Helsingfors 
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This book is a doctoral thesis in the history of 
architecture at the School of Architecture, the 
Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm. I 
was asked by the School of Architecture, as a 
professional philosopher, to act as an "extra 
opponent" at the public defence of the thesis (on 
May 19th, 1992) because of the "philosophical 
approach" of the thesis. My remarks here are 
basically the critical remarks I made as oppo-
nent. I do not intend to give anything like a full 
review. 
The book consists of three chapters: Chapter 
1 ("Style is more") is mainly a historical intro-
duction to discussions about "style" in art and 
architecture. Chapter 2 ("Theoretical back-
ground") sketches the philosophical background 
and presents the abstract form of the author's 
"theory of style". Chapter 3 ('Three architects 
from the turn of the century") discusses Antoni 
Gaudi, Charles Rennie Mackintosh and Otto 
Wagner from the point of view of the authors 
"theory of style". Except for some general re-
marks on the authors concept(s) of style I limit 
myself to the philosophical points (which are 
almost exclusively to be found in Chs. 1-2). All 
unspecified page references below are to the 
book being reviewed. 
Before I turn to critical remarks I want to say 
something about what the author aims at. 
The title of the book, Origins of style, partly 
mirrors Martin Heidegger's work The Origin of 
the Work of Art, which was a source of inspira-
tion for the present author's "theory of style". 
The inspiration seems to have been mediated 
mainly through a book by Martin Kusch, Lan-
guage as Calculus vs. Language as Universal 
Medium (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dord-
recht 1989). The plural in the title, origins, em-
phasises the fact that (the concept of) style has 
more than one origin. In chapter 1 the author 
gives a historical account of concepts of style 
and discussions about what styles there are. She 
wants to present various approaches to style and 
to the question what architecture really is. 
It is sometimes difficult to follow the discus-
sions in Chapter 1 because the author both tries 
to give a historical account and pursue her own 
line of analysis with the goal of separating what 
is right (with regard to style) from what is wrong. 
The author obviously thinks that "style" is often 
used in a much too formal and/or superficial 
sense. She wants to "reach beyond the ornamen-
tal surface" in order to "find a deeper meaning 
in the concept of style" (preface). 
One sense of the word "origin" in the title of 
the thesis is "historical origin". Another sense, 
the more important one for the author, is origin 
as (conceptual and/or ontological) source, 
foundation or essence. Style in architecture has 
its origin, its essence, beneath the surface of the 
building. The author finds this source or origin 
in "the underlying philosophy, the carrying 
idea which goes through the whole work of art" 
(p. 29). She even talks about style as underlying 
philosophy (cf. p. 28-29). This idea is related, the 
author claims, to Heidegger's and Gadamer's 
ideas about truth and truthfulness in art. Style is 
thus associated with truth, truthfulness and 
authenticity. Moreover, style is said to be what 
distinguishes architecture from mere building. 
The author tries to formulate what she calls a 
"universal theory of style", even, I think, a uni-
versal theory of universal style. Such a project is 
very ambitious, indeed it aims so high that it is 
doomed to fail somewhere. What makes this 
book interesting, it should be added, is exactly 
that it aims so high. This universal character of 
style is said to be related to the universal nature 
of language; here too Heidegger acts as a source 
of inspiration. I do not really understand exactly 
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the connection between language and style is, 
whether it is a structural analogy, a "shared 
essence" or something else. I will return to these 
difficulties. 
The author's "universal theory of style" -
perhaps better called a "philosophy of style" - is 
ultimately formulated in seven points (p. 59-60): 
5.1 We cannot analyze architecture starting 
from the categories "style" or "form" etc., 
since these categories are accessible only 
in and through the work of art itself. 
5.2 Style shows us what a building truly is. It 
reveals the architecture of the building. 
5.3 The work of architecture lets the style 
occur. 
5.4 Style expresses artistic truth. 
5.5 Creating architecture corresponds struc-
turally to its preservation; both are more 
matters of receiving than /of/ active parti-
cipation. 
5.6 Poetry is the essence of architecture. Style 
transforms a mere building into architec-
ture. 
5.7 Architecture is bound to people and deter-
mines their essence and takes part in their 
history. 
Critical comments 
I focus on the question whether the author's 
"theory of style" can be labelled phenomeno-
logical and/or Heideggerian. It must also be 
stressed that what are presented as quotations 
from Heidegger are sometimes far from that. I 
begin, however, with some remarks on the con-
cepts of "style" and "truth". 
One can distinguish at least three notions of 
style in this book. Their possible interrelation-
ship is never made clear. In the preface it is said 
that vernacular architecture, for example a fish-
erman's cottage, sometimes has "more style" 
than academic architecture. Thus there is a sense 
in which something has or does not have style, or 
has more or less style. On the other hand, a buil-
ding or a work of art can exemplify a particular 
style, for example, Art Noveau or a "personal 
style". Much of the historical background dis-
cussion concerns this notion of style. There is 
also, I think, a third notion of style. In the last 
section of the book it is said that Art Noveau is 
style (p. 161; cf. also the last sentence of the 
abstract): it seems then that something that is 
conventionally regarded as a style either "is 
style" or "is nor". 
There is no need for strict definitions. A rea-
der would, however, have been helped by a few 
words by way of clarification. Later in the book 
it becomes clear that the problem at issue is not 
various styles but the question of whether or not 
an object, a building, has style. We must then ask 
why the author has chosen style as the decisive 
notion because she also uses other concepts in 
her discussion, such as meaning and architec-
ture. The main question could also be formulated 
as: What is the difference between (mere) buil-
ding and architecture? "Style distinguishes ar-
chitecture from mere building", the author says 
(p. 29). 
The author claims that she uses a "pheno-
menological approach". However, none of the 
phenomenological thinkers discussed in the 
book appears to use style as their key notion. A 
short section is devoted to "Gadamer's view of 
style" (p. 26-27). Style is apparently not one of 
the most important concepts in Gadamer's re-
flections on art and truth. Nor does the author 
build on his notion of style. In the following 
section, "The phenomenological conception", 
Norberg-Schulz's ideas are briefly mentioned 
(p. 27-28). He is said to talk about "architectural 
totality" rather than style. Norberg-Schulz, the 
author says, "prefers to write about foundation 
or meaning in architecture when he comes clos-
est to the word style used in my study" (p. 28). 
Nor does Heidegger, to my knowledge, use 
"style" in his theory of art. I will return to Hei-
degger below. 
The question remains: why did the author 
choose style as her key concept? It would indeed 
have been much easier to associate to the pheno-
menological tradition if she had, for example, 
used meaning. 
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In a section called "Style as underlying philo-
sophy" the author says: "This study uses the 
word style in a very broad sense: Style is the 
underlying philosophy, the carrying idea which 
goes through the whole work of art." (p. 29). A 
little later on the same page she says that "if 
architecture lacks philosophy, no style can 
emerge." Style, then, is both the underlying 
philosophy and the expression of this philoso-
phy. How do we experience style? In the section 
"On methods of studying style" the author says 
about architecture: "What we feel and perceive 
visually is its style." (p. 35-36). 
The question now becomes: Who is to decide? 
This question becomes critical because the au-
thor wants to get at "universal style", not style 
according to one person (or culture) or another (I 
will shortly give a quotation to illustrate this 
point). 
Let us now turn to the notion of truth. Let me 
begin by quoting Heidegger: 
The truth of which we have spoken does not 
coincide with that which is generally recog-
nized under the name and assigned to cogni-
tion and science as a quality in order to 
distinguish it from the beautiful and the good, 
... (Epilogue to "The Origin of the Work of 
Art", in Poetry, Language, Thought, a collec-
tion translated by A. Hofstadter, Harper & 
Row, New York 1975, p. 80-81. Henceforth, 
I refer to this collection as PLT.) 
The words "true" and "truth" have many uses in 
language. In the lectures which constitute The 
Origin of the Work of Art Heidegger emphasises 
this. He says, for example, that "we call not only 
a proposition true, but also a thing, true gold in 
contrast to sham gold. True means here genuine, 
real gold." (PLT, p. 50). However, most uses of 
"true" seem to me to be part of a family of 
concepts which includes, among others, honest, 
real, genuine and authentic, in contrast to, for 
example, deceptive, sham and imitation. I say 
this because Anna-Maija Ylimaula emphasises 
several times that truth and truthfulness are es-
sential to art and architecture. Style has some-
thing to do with truth and truthfulness, the 
question is what, precisely. 
In this book there is a section called "On truth 
and fallacy" (p. 43^15). It begins as follows. 
The question of truth as it emerges in the 
experience of art was the starting point for 
Gadamer's Truth and Method. He is interes-
ted in the ontology of the work of art and of its 
hermeneutical significance. But Gadamer's 
main contribution for architecture is the way 
he uses and analyzes the concept of truth all the 
way from the hermeneutic relevance of Aris-
totle to the Kantian critique and Heidegger's 
hermeneutical phenomenology. The German 
word Wahrheit seems wider than the English 
truth. Being wahr in architecture means hon-
esty and truth on every level of the artistic 
work. (p. 43). 
The speculation about the difference between 
Wahrheit and truth is not supported by any evi-
dence. I can find no important difference, and 
whether there is one or not does not really matter. 
But given the quotation, it is remarkable that the 
author never goes into Gadamer's discussion 
about truth. (A section in chapter 2 called "Her-
meneutics, artistic truth and the concept of style" 
does not at all go into the concept of truth, be it 
artistic or not.) And later in the section "On truth 
and fallacy" the author even says: "Truth in 
architecture is simply honesty in design and 
genuine materials." (p. 45). Talk about truth then 
seems unnecessary. Though these last quoted 
words are perhaps a "slip of the pen"; as such 
they bear witness to an unfortunate conceptual 
carelessness which emerges at some places in 
the book. 
The author has gone into several philosophi-
cally very difficult concepts. Another is lan-
guage. Heidegger says in his essay "Language": 
"Still, to talk about language is presumably even 
worse than to write about silence." (PLT, p. 190). 
The author has herself referred to these very 
words on p. 50. 
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It is difficult to talk about language in a Hei-
deggerian way, as a "universal medium" to use 
Martin Kusch's expression. In many places the 
author uses a more or less Heideggerian way of 
talking about language but in others she says 
things about language which would be incon-
ceivable from the point of view of Heidegger -
even with a broad interpretation of Heidegger. I 
give a couple of examples and after that I point 
out two problematic aspects of what the author 
says about the relation between style and lan-
guage. 
As the first example, the author talks, in the 
section "On architectural language" about "lan-
guage as an analytical device" (p. 30) and, as 
support (!), Heidegger's statement that language 
is included in the closest confines of man's 
being. Certainly, to Heidegger language is nei-
ther a thing nor a "device". The author conti-
nues: 
To represent universally what holds univer-
sally is the basic feature of thought. To reflect 
on the meaning of one's language is to reach 
into the speaking of one's thoughts. Human 
expression is always a presentation and re-
presentation of the real and the unreal. Lan-
guage speaks, both to speaker and those spo-
ken to. Man speaks in that he responds to 
language. 
The reference given by the author is PLTp. 190-
192 (an early section of Heidegger's essay "Lan-
guage"). She should have included p. 189 as 
well, but that is a minor point. The important 
point is that this quotation contains a mixture of 
correct quotation, misunderstanding and free 
invention. It has little to do with what Heidegger 
actually tries to bring home, except the words 
Language speaks. Heidegger says: "To represent 
universally what holds universally is, according 
to prevalent views, the basic feature of thought." 
(PLT, p. 189.) He refers to a view which he then 
contrasts with his own. And the case is exactly 
the same when Heidegger says: "Finally, human 
expression is always a presentation and repre-
sentation of the real and the unreal." (PLT, p. 
192.) The author has definitely shown that she 
has not understood what Heidegger says even on 
a quite elementary level - it is basically a matter 
of correct reading. Her misunderstandings are 
not on the level of difficult philosophical inter-
pretation. 
As my second and final example I mention a 
few things said in a section called "How do the 
theories of language relate to architecture: 
towards a theory of style": "Heidegger was one 
for whom language served a wide and relative 
purpose: through him I have come to the rea-
lization that language is signs, meanings and 
understanding. ... The goal of language is to 
communicate.** (p. 58). This again is a mis-
understanding of Heidegger, which turns his 
ideas into the conventional wisdom about lan-
guage which Heidegger wanted to free himself 
from. Language has no "goal" according to Hei-
degger, again: language is no device - language 
is language, language speaks. 
I can find no consistent view of language at all 
in this book. However, let me leave language as 
a general topic and point to two problems which 
are immediately relevant to what the author 
wants to argue. 
She writes: "So there is only one language, as 
a whole, and we stand and live and work in it. 
The same way there is also universal style in 
architecture, one that covers all aspects, all pe-
riods and all regions, etc." (p. 52). The same 
way? Which way? More specifically, language 
(in a universal sense) does not seem to be on an 
equal level with style unless it is identical with 
it. Language is also a medium for talking about 
architecture and style - and thereby a medium 
for (the constitution of) architecture and style, 
but not the other way round. The author has 
noted that herself in a passage where she says 
that according to Heidegger "all art, including 
architecture, is dependent on the truths revealed 
by our language" (p. 50). Thus, style seems not 
to be on an equal level with language. What is the 
relation between language and style? I find no 
answer in the book. 
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I turn to the second problem, which is connec-
ted to Heidegger's famous saying that language 
is the house of Being, to which the author refers 
(p. 50). I found a relevant quotation from Hei-
degger in Martin Kusch's book Language as 
Calculus vs. Language as Universal Medium, 
apparently the author's main source, but she 
does not refer to these words: 
Some time ago I called language, clumsily 
enough, the house of Being. If man by virtue of 
his language dwells within the claim and call 
of Being, then we Europeans presumably dwell 
in an entirely different house than Eastasian 
man. ... And so, a dialogue from house to 
house remains nearly impossible, (quoted from 
Kusch, p. 213, who refers to "Aus einem Ge-
spräch von der Sprache", in Unterwegs zur 
Sprache.) 
If it is impossible to step outside language we 
may be stuck inside our own language. Though 
there may be a sense, a sense which does not ad-
mit of a plural, in which language is universal, 
there are essentially many different languages. 
This (real or apparent) relativism is actually re-
corded by the author (in the diagram from Kusch 
and Hintikka on p. 59). If there is no universal 
language can there still be "universal style"? Or 
to put it more in line with an earlier question: 
What is the relation between universal style and 
style as recognised by various persons or cul-
tures? 
Before I turn to my last topic, viz. the question 
of what role Heidegger's reflections on art play 
in the book, I want to discuss the content and 
scope of the author's "phenomenological ap-
proach" - which is announced in the subtitle of 
the book. The author writes in the section called 
"On methods of studying style": 
The core of this thesis is that style is the factor 
which makes the difference between mere buil-
dings and architecture. The stylistic theory 
which I aim towards is an architectural appli-
cation of a phenomenological theory of art. 
The art theory developed by Heidegger is stu-
died in connection with Husserl and Gada-
mer, in order to avoid having Heidegger iiber 
alles but rather unter anderem. The develop-
ment of language from calculus towards uni-
versal medium is derived from the discussions 
with Martin Kusch and his published investi-
gations and then applied to architecture. 
By using the phenomenological framework 
I attempt to track down the essence of style in 
the works of Gaudi, Mackintosh and Wagner. 
My approach is not that of a scientific analyst, 
but rather Heideggerian: I have tried to illumi-
nate the concept of style with my personal 
perception and knowledge, (p. 36). 
I have said enough about "language". I now turn 
to "Heidegger unter anderem". It is simply false. 
In the book there is almost nothing about Gada-
mer and virtually nothing about Husserl. To be 
somewhat more precise: Some general things 
are said about Husserl, but there is not one single 
reference to a work of Husserl and as far as I can 
judge no traces of influence. There are about ten 
references to Gadamer's Truth and Method, but 
the only things that are brought up are quite 
general remarks. As I already pointed out above, 
there is no attempt to go into his theory of truth 
in art. 
Nor is it Heidegger iiber alles. I thereby return 
to the topic of how the author has used Heideg-
ger. I divide my discussion into three parts. First 
I take up three points attributed to von Hermann. 
Then I point out a serious absence of scholarly 
exactness as regards quotations and references. 
Thirdly I question that the author's theory of 
style is Heideggerian at all. 
The author refers in the section "Towards the 
origins of style" to "Heidegger's discussion of 
the formal origin of style" though no such dis-
cussion seems to exist - Heidegger talks about 
the origin of art. Anyway, the author approaches 
the formal origin of art through F. W. von Her-
mann's "interpretation of Heidegger". The three 
points she gives (p. 55) are confusing and con-
fused, above all because they only state relations 
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between the artist (architect) and the work of art 
(architecture). I find it better not to quote it. 
(The book also mistakenly says "the art" instead 
of "the artist" in all three points, as pointed out in 
the Errata list handed out at the public defence.) 
F. W. von Hermann, in his book Heidegger's 
Philosophie der Kunst. Eine systematische Inter-
pretation der Holzwege-Abhandlung "Der Ur-
sprung des Kunstwerkes (Vittorio Klostermann, 
Frankfurt am Main 1980, p. 3), formulates three 
points which state relations between three things: 
the artist, the work of art and art. In the original, 
von Hermann talks about "drei unterschied-
liche Weisen des Ursprung-seins": 
1. die Kunst als das Entspringenlassen von 
Kunstwerk und Künstler, 
2. die Künstler als der Ursprung des Kunst-
werkes, 
3. das Kunstwerk als der Ursprung des Künst-
lers. 
These can be translated roughly as: 
1. art as that which lets the work of art and the 
artist come forth (into existence), 
2. the artist as the origin of the work of art, 
3. the work of art as the origin of the artist. 
The author completely misses the first point. 
Anyway, referring to von Hermann is carrying 
coals to Newcastle, because these three relations 
are all pointed out explicitly on the very first 
page of Heidegger's The Origin of the Work of 
Art. I quote from the beginning of the essay: 
Origin here means that from and by which 
something is what it is and as it is. What 
something is, as it is, we call its essence or 
nature. The origin of something is the source 
of its nature. The question concerning the ori-
gin of the work of art asks about the source of 
its nature. On the usual view, the work arises 
out of and by means of the activity of the artist. 
But by what and whence is the artist what he 
is? By the work; for to say that the work does 
credit to the master means that it is the work 
that first lets the artist emerge as a master of his 
art. The artist is the origin of the work. The 
work is the origin of the artist. Neither is with-
out the other. Nevertheless, neither is the sole 
support of the other. In themselves and in their 
interrelations artist and work are each of them 
by virtue of a third thing which is prior to both, 
namely that which also gives artist and work of 
art their names - art (PLT, p. 17). 
"The central thoughts in The Origin of the 
Work of Art", the author says, "have been sum-
marized by Martin Kusch." (p. 51). Immediately 
after this she says that she has "added some 
explanatory comments from the original text of 
Heidegger". I will soon give the seven points of 
Kusch's summary (A.1-A.7; the formulation of 
A.5 is changed by the author without that being 
indicated). But first I want to issue a warning to 
the reader of the book: Do not trust the "expla-
natory comments"! The so-called quotations are 
all inaccurate compared with the sources referred 
to in the footnotes (mosdy PLT). In some cases 
the author has used a revised translation (from 
Kusch), without that being said. That is a minor 
problem. In other cases the translation is changed 
in strange ways, actually concealing what is in 
the original. In some cases the text becomes 
impossible to understand at all. I will not go into 
detail but I want to stress that the "quotations" 
given after A.2, A.4, A 6 and A.7 are seriously 
flawed. For example, the first sentence in the 
quotation after A.2 is: "The nature of art would 
then be this: the truth of beings fulfilling its 
function or role." Instead of "fulfilling its func-
tion or role" it should read "setting itself to 
work"! They should not be attributed to Hei-
degger. When I indicated these inaccuracies at 
the public defence the author said that the person 
who did the language revision probably had 
changed them! This cannot be accepted as an 
excuse. 
I have also found inaccuracies in quotations 
and page references in many other places. Some 
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such things always exist. But this book scores 
below the mark of what is acceptable in a scho-
larly work 
The author gives her "universal theory of 
style based on Heidegger's art theory" in seven 
points, S.1-S.7 (I have stated them in the in-
troduction). The reader immediately assumes 
that they mirror Kusch's seven points, A.1-A.7. 
However, it is highly revealing to compare them 
point for point (here A. 1-A.7 is taken from p. 
51-52, revised according to the author's later 
Errata II, and S.1-S.7 from p. 59-60): 
A. 1 We cannot analyze the work of art starting 
from the categories of "thing" or "equip-
ment," since both of these categories be-
come accessible only in and through the 
work of art itself. 
5.1 We cannot analyze architecture starting 
from the categories "style" or "form" etc., 
since these categories are accessible only 
in and through the work of art itself. 
A.2 The work of art shows us what a being 
truly is. It reveals the being in its Being. 
5.2 Style shows us what a building truly is. It 
reveals the architecture of the building. 
A. 3 The work of art is a happening, a strife 
between world and earth. 
5.3 The work of architecture lets the style 
occur. 
A.4 Art is a happening of truth, truth is a strife 
between illumination and concealment 
5.4 Style expresses artistic truth. 
A. 5 The production of works of art corre-
sponds structurally to their preservation; 
both are matters of receiving ratherthan of 
active doing. 
5.5 Creating architecture corresponds struc-
turally to its preservation; both are more 
matters of receiving than /of/ active parti-
cipation. 
A.6 Poetry is the essence of art. 
5.6 Poetry is the essence of architecture. Style 
transforms a mere building into architec-
ture. 
A.7 Art is bound to nations and determines 
their essence and their history. 
5.7 Architecture is bound to people and de-
termines their essence and takes part in 
their history. 
Compare these points carefully! In some cases 
one can find a formal similarity, in some not even 
that. The "step" from A to S can, as far as I could 
see, not at all be supported by reference to Hei-
degger. Take a look for example at A.2 and S.2, 
where "the being in its Being" and "the architec-
ture of the building" play similar roles! But S.2 
seems to have nothing to do with Heidegger. 
Even if S.1-S.7 is in some sense a "a universal 
theory of style", it is certainly not based on 
Heidegger's theory of art. 
Some words of conclus ion 
It may be thought that I have been too philo-
sophically critical of a book about architecture. 
Note that I have not criticised philosophical 
interpretations but pointed out that the philo-
sophical parts of the book are not in accord with 
elementary scholarly standards with respect to 
references, textual reading and conceptual cla-
rity. The theory of style suggested is said to be 
based on Heidegger's art theory. It is probably 
inspired by some things Heidegger said. But that 
is different. The author even calls her approach 
"Heideggerian" (in a quotation given above). It 
is, I think, very far from it. 
It is very difficult, or even impossible, to ex-
tract an answer to the question of what art is 
from Heidegger. Actually he says in the addendum 
to The Origin of the Work of Art: "What art may 
be is one of the questions to which no answers 
are given in the essay. What gives the impres-
sion of such an answer are directions for ques-
tioning." (PLT, p. 86). 
RECENSIONER & ANMÄLNINGAR 121 
The author says at one place: "Heidegger is a 
thinker for whom precision is no virtue." (p. 50). 
This is, I think, a complete misunderstanding. 
That the author thinks so may, however, account 
for some of the problems in this book. I hasten 
to add that the book also contains a lot of inte-
resting and challenging thoughts about style, 
art and architecture. 
It is a pity that the manuscript was not suf-
ficiently critically worked through before it was 
presented as a doctoral thesis. It is well worth to 




To Anne Fried: 
I am deeply grateful to Anne Fried for her con-
structive review of my thesis. Since she was born 
in Vienna in 1903 her point of viewing Art Nou-
veau is quite different from mine, an architect 
born in the 1950's and working in northern 
Finland. Fried takes up big issues like the one 
of social deceit, if social problems were cove-
red under the guilded surface of the Secession-
architecture, but to find answers to such ques-
tions in a small thesis was not possible for me. I 
am glad that Fried clarified the Heideggerian 
meaning of the word poesis. About A .7 I dis-
agree with Fried's interpretation, but respect her 
point of view in this matter, which evidently has 
another importance to her than it has to me. 
To Bengt Molander: 
I am deeply sorry that Bengt Molander forgets 
that my thesis deals with history of architecture. 
I wasn't trying to become a doctor of philoso-
phy, but became one in technology. As an oppo-
nent Molander found that I defended my thesis 
well. He could have said that, too, otherwise one 
might get another impression from the article 
above. I am just an architect who wanted to look 
at the philosophy in the concept of style. Molan-
der as a representative of analytic philosophy 
cannot accept the fact which I am trying to 
prove: that style in its essence is basically a spi-
ritual matter. Even Georg Henrik von Wright 
has recently admitted that there are many things 
which cannot be reached by the means of analy-
tic philosophy. I find that architecture is one of 
them. There is a big gap between logicians and 
phenomenologists, and the architects who have 
been following the Wittgensteinian paths have 
thrown away not only phenomenology but all 
approaches which contain existential or idealis-
tic features. Molander's own book on philoso-
phy did not mention Husserl, Heidegger or Gada-
mer. Since he admits that "A.1-S.7 is in some 
sense a «universal theory of style»" it is all that 
I was hoping for and aiming at, and his demand 
to call it "inspired by some things that Heideg-
ger said" rather than Heideggerian, suits me 
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